establishing the so-called Eisenwerk principle, 3 pursuant to which the adoption of arbitration rules was said to constitute a displacement of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. 4 The decision was not well received in arbitration circles, with a number of academic commentaries criticising the approach taken in Eisenwerk to the interactions and relationships between the curial law governing an arbitration, and procedural rules which may be adopted for the purposes of conducting an arbitration. This case note comprises four main parts. In Part II, the legal background to the two recent decisions (that background consisting of the Eisenwerk case and Australia's international commercial arbitration legislation) is reviewed. In Parts III and IV, Cargill International SA and Wagners respectively are examined. Finally, in Part V, the current status of Eisenwerk in Australian law (in light of these two decisions and recent legislative reforms) is considered. Both decisions are notable not only because of the controversy surrounding the original Eisenwerk decision, but also because of the differing approach each takes to the Eisenwerk principle and the place that principle now occupies within an amended legislative regime for international commercial arbitration in Australia. 
II THE LEGAL BACKGROUND -EISENWERK AND THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AMENDMENT ACT 1989 (CTH)
The legal background to the Cargill International SA and Wagners decisions can be traced not only to the Eisenwerk case, but also further back to the International Arbitration Amendment Act 1989 (Cth).
The If the parties to an arbitration agreement have (whether in the agreement or in any other document in writing) agreed that any dispute that has arisen or may arise between them is to be settled otherwise than in accordance with the Model Law, the Model Law does not apply in relation to the settlement of that dispute.
This effectively established the Model Law 1985 as a default legal regime for the regulation of international commercial arbitration in Australia, but also preserved the right of parties to 'opt out' if they so wished. 
A The Facts
The dispute before the Court in Cargill International SA arose out of a partial award rendered by an arbitrator on 7 December 2009. 20 The substance of the dispute between the parties at arbitration concerned a claim by Excel Coal Ltd (known as Peabody Australia Mining Ltd at the time of litigation) for money owing in relation to deliveries of coal, and a counterclaim by Cargill International SA for demurrage. 21 In the partial award, the arbitrator found that moneys were owing to Excel Coal Ltd, and also dismissed the counterclaim pursued by Cargill International SA. 
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The first prong of Cargill International SA's attack on the partial award was an application for leave to appeal that award pursuant to the Commercial Arbitration Act 1984 (NSW) section 38(4)(b).
It had two alternative bases for doing so, and the way in which its arguments were framed directly called into question the correctness of Eisenwerk. 24 The second (and alternative) prong of Cargill International SA's attack on the partial award was an application for an order of the Court that the partial award be set aside under article 34(2)(b)(ii) Model Law 1985, 25 It can therefore be seen that Cargill International SA's alternative claims for relief against the arbitrator's award were based on both the domestic arbitration legislation of New South Wales, and also Australia's international commercial arbitration legislation. In determining Cargill International SA's challenge to the partial award, Ward J was required to determine which of the two legal regimes in fact governed the arbitration as 'an initial jurisdictional question'. which provides that an award 'may be set aside by the court … if … the court finds that … the award is in conflict with the public policy of this given the arbitration clause on which the arbitration had been based in this case:
In respect of matters which are to be referred to an Expert pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this clause 18 any appeals from the Experts [sic] decisions, and other disputes or claims arising out of or in connection with a Transaction and/or this Agreement, including any questions regarding its existence, validity or termination, shall be referred to International Arbitration under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce with any arbitration to be heard in Sydney in the English language before three arbitrators.
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B The Decision
In considering the issue of whether or not the parties had opted out of the Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21, the Court undertook its analysis in two stages.
The First Question -Is Adoption of Procedural Rules an Opting Out of the Model Law 1985?
First, the Court directly considered the question of whether adoption of a set of procedural arbitration rules constitutes an implied agreement to oust the Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21. In doing so it directly considered the correctness of Eisenwerk.
Ward J commenced analysis of this question by determining that an agreement to opt out of the Model Law 1985 pursuant to the then International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21 may be either express or implied. 28 In this particular respect, her Honour was in agreement with the approach taken in Eisenwerk. However, her Honour disagreed with the more controversial aspect of the Eisenwerk decision. In relation to the Eisenwerk principle, her Honour opined:
Eisenwerk stands as authority for the proposition that, by expressly adopting a different 'form of arbitration' (there, that being the ICC Rules), parties will be taken to have shown a sufficient intention not to adopt the form or system of arbitration provided for under the Model Law (and that this is sufficient to amount to an opt-out agreement for the purposes of the Commonwealth Act).
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The Court did expressly note the deference which must be accorded by it to decisions of the Queensland Court of Appeal, 31 Ward J noted that the reasoning underlying the Eisenwerk decision was based on a number of premises:
however ultimately held that the reasoning employed in Eisenwerk was plainly wrong and should not be followed.
What was the reasoning underlying the conclusion in Eisenwerk? Although reference was made by Pincus JA, first, to the perceived high level of inconvenience which would follow from a result that the parties are bound to both a Model Law arbitration and to an ICC arbitration; secondly to the fact that the former would not be an arbitration under the aegis of an established international organization, as the latter would be; and, thirdly, to the fact that the Model Law had not then been widely adopted, the basis for the conclusion that there had been an implied opting out of the Model Law was the perceived inconsistency and irreconcilability as between the provisions of the Model Law and those of the ICC Rules.
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In relation to the three 'peripheral or background matters', the Court noted: 33 • first, that 'the perceived inconvenience … is overstated' given that many of the Model Law 1985's provisions are default provisions and thus 'there is no reason why the two systems could not operate together';
• second, that this matter was not relevant 'in pointing to the intention of the parties' on the matter under consideration; and • third, 'apart from the question of how this would be relevant … the breadth of acceptance worldwide of the Model Law is now very different from that which was the case in 1999'.
Further, in relation to the principal basis for the Eisenwerk decision, the Court emphasised the difference between the law governing an international commercial arbitration (the lex arbitri) and any chosen procedural rules of arbitration. 34 After noting that 'the decision in Eisenwerk has been roundly criticised for policy reasons … and as to the perceived failure to recognise the distinction between the lex arbitri and the procedural rules governing arbitration', 35 Ward J noted that such criticism 'confirms the view I would in any event have formed … that there is a distinction between adoption of procedural rules and the application of the lex arbitri and that since the Model Law … permits the adoption of rules other than those for which it would in default of an alternative choice have provided, the choice by the parties of the ICC Rules to apply in their arbitration would not of itself constitute an opting out of the Model Law'.
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In its conclusion on the first question the Court held that the parties, 'simply by referring their disputes to arbitration under the ICC Rules', had not 'impliedly opted out of the Model Law'.
37 While adverting to the fact that the language used in the arbitration agreements in both Cargill International SA and Eisenwerk differed 38 and that it was 'possible' to reach this conclusion 'simply by distinguishing the facts' in the two cases, since Eisenwerk's reasoning appeared to have its basis in the fact that the Model Law and the ICC Arbitration Rules were incompatible, it seemed to Ward J 'that it is by no means clear that it can be distinguished in that fashion'.
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[I]nsofar as Eisenwerk is authority for the proposition that the adoption by the parties of procedural rules (such as the ICC Rules) to govern the conduct of the arbitration of their disputes amounts of itself to an implied agreement On the basis of its analysis of these two questions, the Court concluded that there was no agreement between the parties, pursuant to the then International 40 Ibid [91] . 41 Ibid [92] . 42 Ibid [95] . 43 
C Comments
From an analytical point of view, perhaps the most interesting facet of Ward J's decision in Cargill International SA is the way in which her Honour approaches the similarities and differences of that case vis-à-vis Eisenwerk.
In relation to the first question considered by Ward J -whether the adoption of procedural rules constitutes an opting out of the Model Law 1985 -her Honour drew express attention to the fact that distinguishing Cargill
International SA and Eisenwerk on the basis of the different wording of their respective arbitration clauses was 'possible'. 51 However, in her Honour's opinion, it was 'by no means clear' that this distinction could be made (given the basis of the reasoning in Eisenwerk), thus requiring a decision by the Court on the correctness or otherwise of Eisenwerk. 52 However, when Ward J came to consider the second question -whether Eisenwerk's existence affected the objective intentions of the parties -a different approach was adopted. In this contractual interpretation context, her On this first question, it appears that Ward J was of the opinion that Cargill International SA and Eisenwerk were not so different as to require the two cases to be distinguished. 47 Any dispute or difference whatsoever arising out of or in connection with this contract shall be and is hereby submitted to arbitration in accordance with and subject to the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. In the absence of an agreement by the parties to the appointment of an arbitrator, the appointing person shall be the National President of the Institute of Arbitrators and Mediators Australia (IAMA). The administrating body shall be [IAMA] . There shall be one arbitrator, the language of the arbitration shall be English, the place of the arbitration shall be Brisbane. • in relation to question (b), concerning whether the Eisenwerk principle was distinguishable on the basis that the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules had been chosen by the parties rather than the ICC Arbitration Rules, the Court indicated that it was 'inappropriate to answer this question'; and
• in relation to question (c), concerning whether the Eisenwerk principle was correctly decided (should the answer to question (b) be 'no'), the Court indicated that 'no answer to this question is required' given the answer to question (b). While this disposed of the issues in dispute for the parties, what is most interesting about Wagners is the Court's reasoning, the way in which it interpreted Eisenwerk, and the ways in which these matters differed from the approach taken in Cargill International SA.
It is clear from the judgment of Muir JA that the Court would have ideally liked to approach the case more squarely on the basis of contractual interpretation. Muir JA noted, before moving on to consider the three questions raised by the case stated, several key principles of contractual construction, including that:
• the task involves ascertaining the objective intentions of the parties;
• commercial contracts should be given commercially sensible interpretations; and
• in both cases, the surrounding circumstances have importance.
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After doing so, Muir JA noted the 'curious feature' of the case stated, namely the fact that 'nothing is disclosed concerning the parties, the background to the [c]ontract, let alone its terms and conditions' -this leading his Honour to note that the Court's task was 'of a somewhat unusual and sterile nature'. the factual conclusion reached in Eisenwerk need not be reached on its particular facts, the Queensland Court of Appeal was clearly not of the opinion 83 
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The Additional Observations of White JA that Eisenwerk itself had been wrongly decided.
Before moving on from Wagners, it is interesting to note that White JA was willing to offer some further comments on Eisenwerk. White JA suggested that, given that the so-called Eisenwerk principle 'continues to be cited in isolation from the facts, issues and arguments in the case, it does require some revisiting'. 84 White JA suggested that she was in agreement with the observation in the arbitrator's interim award that Eisenwerk 'cannot properly be understood as meaning' that '[a] mere agreement of the parties to adopt, or adapt, any arbitral procedural rules necessarily, or in all circumstances, leads to the legal conclusion that the parties have [opted out of the] Model Law'.
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White JA also adverted to the fact that it appeared the Court in Eisenwerk had 'failed to grapple with the distinction between the lex arbitri … and the procedural rules adopted by the parties for the arbitration proper'. 86 Her Honour suggested that the Model Law 1985 'can sit harmoniously' with the dichotomy between the lex arbitri and procedural arbitration rules. 87 However, in her Honour's ultimate decision, White JA agreed with the answers given to the case stated questions by Muir JA,
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C Comments
and her Honour's additional comments (not being reflected in the reasoning in Muir JA or the judgment of McMurdo P) constitute obiter dicta only.
The greatest practical relevance of Wagners lies in its potential implications for future cases, following its characterisation of the Eisenwerk principle as a factual determination.
As is evident from the Court's reasoning, and its answer to question (a) of the case stated, characterisation of the Eisenwerk principle as a factual determination allowed the later Queensland Court of Appeal to reach a contrary factual determination in a case involving the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, as opposed to the ICC Arbitration Rules which were in issue in Eisenwerk.
However, aspects of the Court's reasoning suggest that its implications may go even further -and may allow a court subsequently seized of a case involving an indistinguishably worded arbitration agreement to come to a decision at odds with Eisenwerk without having to find that it was incorrectly decided. This can be seen in Muir JA's suggestion that '[w]ith the passage of time, circumstances may change so that a provision in a contract worded identically to a provision in a contract construed by a court some time before, may need to be construed differently'. 89 Muir JA gives (as a specific example of a possibly changing circumstance) the increase in usage of the Model Law 1985 so that it has come from being 'something of a novelty to a common practice'.
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V
EISENWERK -NOW AN ANSWERED QUESTION?
If a court in a later case (otherwise indistinguishable from Eisenwerk) found this changing circumstance to be of importance, it may be that the court could draw upon this passage of Muir JA's judgment in order to avoid the result which eventuated in Eisenwerk without having to overrule Eisenwerk itself.
The handing down of the judgments in Cargill International SA and Wagners is particularly timely because, in addition to Eisenwerk being reconsidered by the courts, Eisenwerk has also been recently reconsidered by the legislature.
The Commonwealth Attorney-General launched a review of the International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) on 21 November 2008, 91 and released a Discussion Paper on 6 July 2010, the date upon which the amending legislation received royal assent. 98 It can therefore be seen that as of 6 July 2010, the continuing relevance of Eisenwerk is an answered question. However, in the wake of Cargill International SA and Wagners, its authority concerning international commercial arbitrations conducted pursuant to arbitration agreements entered into before that date 99 remains unclear. While the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Cargill International SA unambiguously rejected the Eisenwerk reasoning, the Queensland Court of Appeal in Wagners characterised the decision in Eisenwerk as being one of fact and (while coming to a different conclusion on the facts of Wagners) did not go so far as to suggest that Eisenwerk was decided incorrectly. Given the arrangements with respect to the temporal applicability of the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2010 (Cth), 100 the 'uncertainty' following Cargill International SA and Wagners 'will persist for some time'.
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VI
CONCLUSION
The handing down of two state court decisions on a now repealed legislative provision may not seem, on its face, to be of great significance. However, viewing the decisions of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Cargill International SA and the Queensland Court of Appeal in Wagners in this way is to ignore their true importance.
The important implications of the Cargill International SA and Wagners decisions can be seen in the facts that:
• the New South Wales Supreme Court and the Queensland Court of Appeal both took very different approaches in their reconsideration of the Eisenwerk case;
• Ward J in the New South Wales Supreme Court was willing to decide that Eisenwerk was plainly wrong and should not be followed by the courts in that State;
• the Queensland Court of Appeal was willing to come to a different decision from the one in Eisenwerk on the facts of the case before it, but unlike Ward J was not prepared to decide that Eisenwerk was wrongly decided given that (in its opinion) the Eisenwerk principle was in truth only a factual determination; and
• despite legislative intervention in the form of a new International Arbitration Act 1974 (Cth) section 21, the old section 21 (considered in Eisenwerk) will continue to apply to international commercial arbitrations conducted pursuant to arbitration agreements concluded before 6 July 2010.
Eisenwerk has been a controversial decision in Australia over the last decade, and after the different approaches taken to its reconsideration in Cargill International SA and Wagners, its ripple effects may continue to be felt for some time.
